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INTRODUCTION
“That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than
that one innocent Person should suffer, is a maxim that has
been long and generally approved,” Benjamin Franklin, 1785. 1
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Santa Clara University School of Law. My thanks to
Professor Kathleen “Cookie” Ridolfi for her helpful guidance in this endeavor.
1. Albert H. Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, 293, (vol. 9 1906)
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That maxim, in one form or another, has been repeated
throughout history2 and has permeated the legal system. 3 It is
a part of Supreme Court precedent 4 and taught not just in law
schools, but in grade schools as well. 5 Worldwide, this truism
has been accepted by many different cultures. 6
The legal system in the United States is based upon the
foundation of the Constitution. Within that Constitution are
certain rights that conform to the founding fathers’ ideal. The
Fourth Amendment provides the right to be secure in our
homes, free from unlawful search and seizure without probable
cause. 7 The Fifth Amendment provides the right to protection
against self-incrimination and requires due process of law
before a person may be denied life, liberty or property. 8 The
Sixth Amendment provides that a person charged with a crime
has the right to the effective assistance of counsel and to a
compulsory process for obtaining favorable evidence in his
case. 9
However, what should the legal system do when the rights
of one person are pitted against the rights of another? How
can we reconcile allowing one person to exercise their rights
when the exercise of those rights pose a threat to the life of
another? What would you think if I told you that there is
currently a loophole within the legal system that not only
allows a known guilty party to remain free, but also allows an
innocent person to suffer for that crime while officers of the
court are aware of the truth? 10 As shocking and outlandish as
this may sound, this loophole scenario has occurred numerous
times, resulting in innocent people spending a large portion of

(letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan, Mar. 14, 1785).
2. See Alexander VolokhVlokh, n Guilty Men, 146 University of
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 174–76 (1997) (citing numerous high profile individuals
throughout history using some form of this maxim in notes 1–15).
3. Id.
4. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970).
5. Dorsey D. Ellis, A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth
Amendment, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 829, 845, 845 n.87 (1970).
6. See Alexander VolokhVlokh, n Guilty Men, 146 University of
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 173 (1997) (Citing numerous high profile individuals
throughout history using some form of this maxim notes 119–127).
7. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8. U.S. Const. amend. V.
9. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
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their lives in prison for a crime they did not commit. 11 This
kind of result completely eviscerates the purpose behind the
justice system. The purpose of the criminal legal system is to
provide justice to those who are wronged, not to inflict
punishment on those individuals the system knows are
innocent. When a person spends time in prison for a crime that
he or she did not commit, while the true perpetrator has
confessed, there is a real problem that must be fixed.
Part II of this Comment will provide examples of actual
cases in which these injustices have occurred and the problems
unique to each. Part III will provide the legal ethics
requirements and will discuss the legal loophole that allowed
these injustices to occur, the many theories that have been
proposed to fix the problem and why they have not yet proven
to be a reliable solution. Part IV will proceed to propose a new
solution based on the introductory maxim. While the solution
may perhaps seem extreme, I hope to demonstrate that an
extreme solution is justified by the founding principles of the
legal system.
I.

EXAMPLE CASES

A. Alton Logan Case
On January 11, 1982, two men committed a robbery at a
McDonald’s in Chicago, Illinois. 12 During the course of that
robbery a security guard, Lloyd Wickliffe, was killed by a
shotgun blast and another security guard, Alvin Thompson,
was wounded. 13 Both guard’s’ handguns were taken, though
no money was stolen. 14 On February 5, 1982, one of the
perpetrators, Edgar Hope, was arrested after fatally shooting
a police officer; he was still carrying the gun he had taken from
Thompson at the McDonald’s robbery. 15 There was no way
Alton Logan could have known that this incident would not
only change his life, but steal a great portion of it from him due
to the loophole in the legal system’s ethical rules.
11. See example cases infra Part II.
12. Maurice Possley, Inmate’s freedom may hinge on secret kept for 26 years,
Chicago Tribune (Jan. 19, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-0119/news/0801180946_1_security-guard-attorney-client-privilege-andrew-wilson.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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On February 7, 1982, Alton Logan was arrested and
charged, along with Hope, for robbery and murder. 16 This
arrest was based on a tip to the police and the erroneous
testimony of three eyewitnesses who identified Logan as a
participant in the McDonald’s robbery and murder. 17 Alton
Logan and Edgar Hope would later be convicted of the
McDonald’s robbery. 18 Hope was sentenced to death, while
Logan was sentenced to life in prison. 19
On February 9, 1982, only two days after Alton Logan’s
arrest in the McDonald’s case, two Chicago police officers were
shot to death. 20 Brothers Andrew Wilson and Jackie Wilson
were arrested and charged with the murders. 21 While
investigating this case, police recovered not only the weapons
used to kill the police officers but also a cache of other weapons,
including the murder weapon used in the McDonald’s case. 22
The guns were found hidden at a location where Andrew
Wilson was known to stay. 23 Police and prosecutors never
pursued the connection between the killing of the police officers
and the McDonald’s murder. 24
Two Cook County assistant public defenders, Dale
Coventry and Jamie Kunz, were appointed to represent
Andrew Wilson in the officer murders. 25 A few weeks later,
Coventry and Kunz were approached by Marc Miller, Edgar
Hope’s defense attorney, with information indicating that
Alton Logan had not committed the McDonald’s murder. 26
Kunz reported that, “Hope said that [Logan] had nothing to do
with the McDonald’s case, and that it was Andrew Wilson who
was with him and Andrew Wilson who shotgunned the security
guard.” 27 According to Kunz’s recollection, when he and
Coventry confronted Wilson about this claim “Wilson said,
16. Id.
17. CBS News, 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man In Prison, (Mar. 6, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/26-year-secret-kept-innocent-man-in-prison;
Possley, supra note 12. .
18. Possley, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Possley, supra note 12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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‘Yeah’ or ‘Uh-huh,’ nodded, grinned, and said, ‘That was
me.’ ” 28 Coventry also recalled that Wilson “kind of chuckled
over the fact that someone else was charged with something he
did.” 29
Coventry and Kunz were bound by legal ethics rules not to
disclose any of the conversation between them and Andrew
Without Wilson’s express permission, their
Wilson. 30
conversation was confidential, and Coventry and Kunz’s
metaphorical hands were tied. 31 On March 17, 1982, in the
hope that they may one day be able to reveal their conversation
with Andrew Wilson, the two assistant public defenders drew
up an affidavit stating, “I have obtained information through
privileged sources that a man named Alton Logan who was
charged with the fatal shooting of Lloyd Wickliffe at on or
about 11 Jan. 82 is in fact not responsible for that shooting that
in fact another person was responsible.” 32 Coventry and Kunz
both signed the affidavit, as well as a witness and notary
public. 33 The affidavit was then sealed in a metal box, held by
Coventry, until after Andrew Wilson’s death twenty-five years
later on November 19, 2007. 34 Kunz stated that they prepared
the document “so that if we were ever able to speak up, no one
could say we were just making this up now.” 35
Harold Winston, a Cook County Assistant Public
Defender, was representing Alton Logan at the time of Andrew
Wilson’s death. 36 He was aware of the rumor that for years,
“Coventry and Kunz had information about Andrew Wilson’s
involvement in the McDonald’s case.” 37 After Wilson’s death,
he contacted Kunz. 38 Kunz then contacted Coventry, and he
located the metal box and unsealed the envelope that he had
been faithfully keeping for over twenty-five years. 39 Coventry
and Kunz were then summoned to court on January 11, 2008,
“where Criminal Court Judge James Schreier ruled that they
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Possley, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Possley, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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could reveal the conversation [they had with Andrew] Wilson
and the contents of the affidavit.” 40
On April 18, 2008, after twenty-six years in prison, Alton
Logan’s conviction was set aside. 41 Logan was released on bail,
pending a new trial. 42 On September 4, 2008, the Illinois
Attorney General’s office dismissed the charges against Logan
stating it was unable to prove Logan’s guilt. 43 Judge Schreier
supported the decision, stating, “From all that I have heard,
Mr. Logan, you did not commit this murder.” 44 Alton Logan
responded, “I’ve been telling everybody for the last 26 years, ‘I
didn’t do this,’ and finally they did the right thing. . . . I’m
happy that I can finally get on with my life, try to do some of
the things I want to do.” 45 Later, Logan reported to 60
Minutes, “I never stopped giving up hope. I’ve always believed
that one day is gone—somebody’s gonna come forth and tell the
truth. But I didn’t know when.” 46
Coventry and Kunz were faced with a strange dilemma,
though unfortunately one that is not uncommon in the legal
system. 47 In their interview with 60 minutes, correspondent
Bob Simon remarked that they “chose to allow [Alton Logan]
to rot away in jail.” 48 Coventry replied, “It seems that way. But
had we come forward right away, aside from violating our own
client’s privilege, and putting him in jeopardy, would the
information that we had have been valued? Would it have
proved anything?” 49 Coventry and Kunz believe it would never
have been allowed in court. 50 As they felt there was no way
out, they at least did what they believed to be their best option:
write the affidavit and get Andrew Wilson’s permission to

40. Id.
41. Maurice Possley, “I’m Not Bitter,” Says Man Who Spent 26 Years in
Prison for Allegedly Murdering a Security Guard (May 6, 2008), Chicago Tribune,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-05-06/news/0805050781_1_murderingjudge-james-schreier-new-trial.
42. Id.
43. Matthew Walberg, South Side Man finally free after 26 years, Chicago
Tribune (Sept. 5, 2008).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. CBS News, supra note 17.
47. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
48. CBS News, supra note 17.
49. Id.
50. Id. (concluding that the information would never have been allowed in
court because it was a violation of attorney-client privilege).
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reveal what he told them after his death. 51
Logan’s case represents two major problems within the
legal system. The first is the issue of confidentiality, and the
loophole which allows an innocent man to remain imprisoned
for twenty-six years while the true perpetrator remains
unpunished for their crimes. 52 The second issue is, had they
come forward with the confession earlier, the system may have
turned away such exculpatory evidence, effectively putting the
constitutional rights of a confessed guilty party above the
constitutional rights of an innocent man sitting in jail for a
crime he did not commit. 53 Perhaps this sounds completely
absurd and improbable, but the next few sample cases will
demonstrate the concerns raised by Coventry and Kunz in the
Logan case.
B. Lee Wayne Hunt Case
Lee Wayne Hunt and Jerry Cashwell were both separately
convicted in 1986 of killing Roland and Lisa Matthews.. 54 The
Matthews had been shot execution style and had their throats
slit in their home near Fayetteville, North Carolina. 55 Lee
Wayne Hunt was convicted based in large part on FBI
testimony regarding bullet analysis, testimony later
discredited by the FBI. 56 In 2005 the FBI reported that
composite bullet lead analysis was found to be scientifically
invalid. 57 While conceding that the FBI’s testimony was
unreliable, prosecutors still argued that Hunt’s conviction
should stand due to two witnesses implicating him in the
murders. 58 Both of those witnesses, one a prison informant,
were provided plea deals at the time in exchange for their
testimony. 59 The circumstantial evidence matching bullets to
Hunt stood unchallenged until 2002. 60

51. Id.
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. John Solomon, The End of a Failed Technique—but Not of a Prison
Sentence, The Washington Post (Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/17/AR2007111701641.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Solomon, supra note 54.
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In 2002, after serving more than a decade in prison for the
killings of Roland and Lisa Matthews, Jerry Cashwell
committed suicide. 61 Prosecutors had long maintained that
Hunt participated in the killings, and Cashwell did nothing to
refute them. 62 However, after Cashwell’s death, Staples
Hughes, the public defender who represented Cashwell at
trial, came forward with information that Cashwell confessed
to him in private that he had single handedly killed the
Matthews after an argument over the television being too
loud. 63 According to Hughes, “Lee Wayne Hunt had nothing to
do with it.” 64 Hughes decided to testify regarding Cashwell’s
confession after his client’s death stating that, “it seemed to me
at that point ethically permissible and morally imperative that
I spill the beans.” 65 Unfortunately, unlike the Alton Logan
case, Hughes never received permission from Cashwell to
reveal his secrets after death. 66
The Cumberland County Superior Court in Fayetteville
did not agree with Hughes. 67 At the 2007 hearing for Hunt’s
request for a new trial, Judge Jack A. Thompson told Hughes
to stop. 68 Judge Thompson warned Hughes, “If you testify . . .
I will be compelled to report you to the state bar. Do you
understand that?” 69 Despite the dire warning, Hughes decided
to continue. 70 Hughes told Judge Thompson that he had
“never, ever, ever before violated a client’s confidence . . . [b]ut
Jerry’s dead. My disclosure can’t hurt him and I have to weigh
that disclosure against the continuing harm” to Lee Wayne
Hunt. 71 Judge Thompson refused to consider the evidence,
writing in his opinion that Hughes committed professional
misconduct. 72 Staples Hughes was reported to the bar for
violating attorney-client privilege by revealing what his client
61. Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting a Wrong, The New York
Times (May 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/weekinreview
/04liptak.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Liptak, supra note 61.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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had told him. 73
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld Judge
Thompson’s ruling. 74 The North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to consider new evidence in the case. 75 Today, Lee
Wayne Hunt, now fifty-five years old, still sits in prison after
serving twenty-eight years and counting. 76 Richard Rosen,
’Hunt’s attorney, stated, “I think as a whole, the judicial
system of North Carolina should be ashamed of their
treatment of this case form (sic) top to bottom.” 77 The state
Supreme Court did not offer an explanation for its refusal to
review the case. 78 In 2008 Hunt’s attorneys expressed their
intention to appeal the case in federal court. 79 In a letter
written by Lee Wayne on September 2014, he stated “that he
is possibly getting a new trial in federal court.” 80
Once again, we have the situation of a lawyer withholding
evidence exonerating an innocent man and a judicial system
blocking his efforts to disclose the evidence after his client’s
death. The legal system has placed barriers for unfortunate
people like Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt to have
exonerating evidence placed just out of reach. “Both the
United States Supreme Court and the North Carolina
Supreme Court have said the lawyer-client privilege survives
death, though they recognized that narrow exceptions might
be possible.” 81 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist writing for
the majority in a 1998 Supreme Court decision said, “ ‘ [c]lients
may be concerned about reputation, civil liability or possible
harm to friends of’ family if their secrets were disclosed after
they died.” 82
In Lee Wayne Hunt’s case, the battle continues. The New
73. See Liptak, supra note 61.
74. Supreme Court Refuses to Consider Hunt’s Appeal, Fayetteville Observer,
Jan. 25 2008, 2008 WLNR 1496357.
75. WRAL Local News, State Supreme Court Won’t Hear Murder Appeal on
Bullet Evidence, (Feb. 2, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2388477.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Free Lee Wayne Hunt Now, Facebook (last visited Dec. 12, 2014, 2:56
PM), https://www.facebook.com/FreeLeeWayneHuntNow. (posting that a letter
was received from Lee Wayne).
81. Liptak, supra note 61.
82. Id. (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998)).
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York Times asked legal ethics professor Monroe Freedman, for
his opinion on the case. 83 Professor Freedman said that, “[i]f
there is no threat of civil action against the client’s estate and
there are no survivors who continue to believe in the client’s
innocence, . . . there is no confidentiality obligation to begin
with.” 84 Hughes agreed, “[w]hat reputational interest did
Jerry have? . . . He had pleaded guilty to killing two people.
He didn’t have an estate. His estate was a pair of shower shoes
and two paperback books.” 85
Lee Wayne Hunt had to wait, like Alton Logan, until the
confessed killer died to gain access to the confidential
information held by lawyers adhering to the rules of legal
ethics. 86 Now, he also faces the arduous task of convincing a
court to consider the exonerating evidence and dismiss the case
against him. The legal system prevents certain evidence from
being admitted in a criminal court to ensure that a person
found guilty was given a fair trial. 87 Should these same rules
be used to bar exculpatory evidence from being used to fix an
injustice and free an innocent man?
C. Macumber Case
In 1962 a young couple was murdered in the desert north
of Scottsdale, Arizona. 88 That murder went unsolved until
1974 when Carol Macumber, “a sheriff’s department employee
going through an ugly divorce,” claimed that her ex-husband,
Bill Macumber had confessed to the killings. 89 Corroborating
evidence was found in an evidence locker at the sheriff
department, which Carol had access to. 90 What Carol could not
know is that Ernesto Valenzuela, already “in prison for two
markedly similar murders, had already bragged to his defense
counsel, Thomas O’Toole, that he had committed [the
murders].” 91 O’Toole later said that Valenzuela actually
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See supra notes 7–9.
88. Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint: When Can A Lawyer Break Privilege?, The
Recorder, (Mar. 01, 2013), http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2013/03/
zitrin-breaking-privilege.php.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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“relished committing the murders.” 92
Following the legal ethics guidelines and abiding by his
duty of confidentiality, O’Toole said nothing initially. 93 If
O’Toole revealed this information Valenzuela, his client, would
have been charged with the murder. 94 However, just prior to
Macumber’s arrest in 1973, Valenzuela was killed while in
O’Toole, after first obtaining permission from
prison. 95
Valenzuela’s mother, agreed to testify at Macumber’s trial. 96
His testimony was not permitted. 97 “[F]irst the trial court and
then the appellate court refused to consider O’Toole’s
Arizona had codified the attorney-client
testimony.”. 98
99
privilege and the courts ruled that Valenzuela’s privilege
survived his death and that permission from his mother was
insufficient. 100 The Supreme Court of Arizona also agreed,
ruling that the attorney-client privilege automatically barred
O’Toole’s testimony. 101 Macumber was convicted. 102
It was not’ until 2009 that Macumber’s case was finally
brought before the Arizona clemency board. 103 With the
continued assistance of O’Toole and an Arizona innocence
project, Macumber was able to convince the clemency board
“that he had be framed by his wife, and that Valenzuela was
Unfortunately, that was not
the [true] perpetrator.” 104
enough. 105 Although the board recommended Macumber’s
release in 2009 and again in 2012, noting that his conviction
was a “miscarriage of justice”, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer
denied clemency. 106 Brewer “then fired the majority of the
board.” 107 It was not’ until Macumber made a deal and plead
no contest to second-degree murder that he was finally freed in

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976).
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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late 2012. 108 Macumber is free, as a convicted felon, after
spending 37 years behind bars. 109
In the Arizona Supreme Court case, Arizona v.
Macumber, 110 Justice Holohan filed a specially concurring
opinion. 111 First, Justice Holohan argued that the United
States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi, 112 “ruled
that it is a violation of due process for a state rule of evidence
to preclude the admission of reliable hearsay declarations
against penal interest when such evidence is offered to show
the innocence of an accused.” 113 According to Justice Holohan,
the evidence offered by O’Toole is admissible under both
Arizona and Federal law. 114 Second, Justice Holohan argued
that, “[t]he real problem is whether the privilege can survive
the constitutional test of due process.” 115 Citing United States
Supreme Court precedents Washington v. Texas 116 and Roviaro
v. United States 117, Justice Holohan pointed out that an
accused has a basic right to present a defense and, in doing so,
has a right to present witness testimony even in the face of a
claim of privilege. 118 According to Justice Holohan, “[t]he
problem of balancing competing interests, privilege versus a
proper defense, is a difficult one, but the balance always
weighs in favor of achieving a fair determination of the
cause.” 119
II.

THE CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

The argument has often been made, that a person’s
constitutional right to present witness testimony should
outweigh a deceased client’s right to confidentiality. 120 While
108. Zitrin, supra note 88.
109. Id.
110. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1084.
111. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1087.
112. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297
(1973).
113. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).
117. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).
118. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring).
119. Id.
120. See e.g., Inbal Hasbani, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised
by A Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 100 J.
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this paper agrees with that view, it also argues that the right
should weigh in favor of an individual’s constitutional right
even when the source of the confidential information is still
living. This loophole must be closed to prevent such absurd
forms of injustice in situations like the ones described above.
While attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of
information are distinct doctrines, together they function as
the gatekeeper of client secrets. 121 The Supreme Court has
asserted that a trial is a “search for truth.” 122 However,
maintaining client secrets flies in the face of truth when those
secrets are kept from the court.
The American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) require devotion to the client despite the consequences
of maintaining those secrets. 123 Not once in the Model Rules,
upon which most state ethical codes are based, will a direct
reference to the discovery and production of the truth be
found. 124 Aside from the few exceptions currently allowed,
strict attorney loyalty is required of all lawyers. 125 This has
been a long accepted standard in the legal profession dating
back as far as 1820 when Lord Brougham famously described
a lawyer’s role:
To save [the] client by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating
the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go
on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 126

Though certain rules do require that a lawyer not mislead,
act deceptively, or commit fraud, there is no rule instructing a
lawyer to proffer the truth. 127 “Devotion to the client, not truth,

Crim. L. & Criminology 277, 307 (2010).
121. See Id. at 282.
122. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986).
123. Mod. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).
124. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth and Honesty in Representing Clients,
20 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 209, 213 (2006).
125. Mod. R. Prof. C. § 1.6(b)(1–7) (2014).
126. Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics,
71–72 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Lord Henry Brougham).
127. Henning, supra note 124.
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is the lawyer’s ultimate duty.” 128 The Model Rules, for
example, instructs a lawyer to question the credibility of a
witness the lawyer knows to be truthful. 129 The judicial system
charges a lawyer with the task of being a “zealous advocate for
the client, putting that person’s interest ahead of all others.” 130
Although attorney-client confidentiality is touted as one of the
most highly valued precepts in the law, the Model Rules do
recognize exceptions to confidentiality in certain situations. 131
A. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Most state ethics rules governing attorney conduct are
based on the Model Rules. 132 A large majority of the states
have adopted some of the language and the numbering system
suggested by the Model Rules. 133 Every lawyer, while not
subject to the Model Rules itself, is subject to discipline for a
breach of the rules of professional conduct adopted by their
state. 134 In order to ensure that lawyers are well informed on
the Model Rules, law students in all but three U.S.
jurisdictions (Maryland, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico) are
required to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination before they may be admitted to the bar in their
state. 135 The Model Rules are a collection of proposed rules
that provide guidelines for the states to draft their own
professional conduct rules. 136
B. Confidentiality of Information
The Model Rules codify confidentiality of information in
rule 1.6. 137 Rule 1.6 provides that, “A lawyer shall not reveal
128. Hasbani, supra note 120 at 282.
129. Id.
130. Henning, supra note 124 at 210.
131. Mod. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(1–7). See Mod. R. Prof. C. 1.6(c) (providing a list
of exceptions when a lawyer may reveal confidences such as; the client intends to
commit a crime, has already used the lawyer’s services for an illegal or fraudulent
act, or to defend against an accusation of wrongful conduct).
132. Stephen Gillers, Roy D. Simon & Andrew M. Perlman, Regulation of
Lawyers, Statutes and Standards, 3 (Con. 25th ed. 2014).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, National
Conference of Bar Examiners (last visited Sept. 16. 15, 2015 115:24 AMPM),
http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpre/.
136. Gillers, supra note 132.
137. Gillers, supra note 132 at 30.
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information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent. . . . ” 138 This covers a very
extensive range of information that a lawyer must keep
confidential. The purpose in providing such an expansive
protection is so that every client may receive competent
representation as allotted by the constitution. 139 Competent
representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all
the facts of the matter he is handling.” 140 The widely held belief
is that clients will not provide a lawyer with full disclosure
without that promise of confidentiality. 141
Benefits aside, confidentiality is at odds with the truth.
The Fifth Amendment provides protection against selfincrimination. 142 An advocate, aware of his client’s guilt, must
not reveal that fact to the court. As every person has a right to
competent representation, 143 which requires full disclosure to
a person’s lawyer, as well as a right not to incriminate one’’s
self, there must be a way to maintain both in a criminal case.
Model Rule 1.6 is that answer, and it is meant to be upheld in
all but the few cases where an exception applies. Adherence to
this rule means that evidence of a person’s guilt will be hidden
from court proceedings, sometimes allowing the guilty to go
free. The courts have accepted this as “the price that society
must pay for the availability of justice to every citizen, which
is the value that the privilege is designed to secure.” 144 They
have explained that the “social good derived from the proper
performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their
clients . . . outweighs the harm that may come from the
suppression of the evidence.” 145
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the
attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized
privileges of the different confidential communications. 146 The
138. Id.
139. Freedman & Smith, supra note 126.
140. Id. at 129. (Citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981)).
141. Hasbani, supra note 120 at 286.
142. Supra note 8.
143. Supra note 9.
144. In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 482
(1990)(quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983)).
145. Id.
146. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
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basis for this privilege is premised on the theory that
encouraging clients to make “full and frank” disclosures
provides their attorneys the ability to offer candid legal advice
and effective representation. 147 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the, “public benefit in encouraging
clients to fully communicate . . . outweighs the harm caused by
the loss of relevant information.” 148
While the attorney-client privilege is not expressly codified
in the Model Rules, Rule 1.6 provides similar protection. 149
The attorney-client privilege is derived from common law and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 150 Each state may adopt their
own version of the attorney-client privilege and, just as the
Model Rules provide guidance, Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 503 (Rule 503), also can assist in the creation of state
rules governing attorney-client privilege. 151 Under Rule 503,
“[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client.” 152
Thus, ethically, the combination of Model Rule 1.6
requiring a lawyer not to reveal “information relating to the
representation of a client” and Rule 503 preventing disclosure
of any “confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services,”
requires an attorney to keep secret almost anything he may
learn from his client. 153 The combination of these two doctrines
fortify the rights every individual has to competent
representation without self incrimination. Although attorney-

147. UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
148. Id.
149. Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in Two
Different Applications, American BarAssociation (May 2007) http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/co
nfidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that attorney-client
privilege only protects the essence of communications by the client and lawyer,
extending to information given for the purpose of obtaining legal representation,
while client-lawyer confidentiality is much more extensive, covering all
information relating to the representation regardless of whether the information
came from the client or any other source).
150. Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. § 503.
151. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence Manual
§ 18.03[1](8th ed. 2007).
152. Supra note 150.
153. Supra notes 131 and 150.
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client confidentiality is generally upheld, there are certain
situations in which the ethical guidelines have deemed
exceptions acceptable. 154 The Model Rules provide seven
exceptions when a lawyer may be allowed to reveal confidential
information. 155 Relevant to this discussion is Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) providing a lawyer the ability to break confidentiality
in order “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm.” 156
III.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM

In the cases described above, the legal system not only
allowed, but also staunchly defended the right of a confessed
guilty party over the rights of individuals falsely accused. A
legal system that would knowingly allow an innocent person to
remain in jail or face execution, while the true perpetrator
remains protected by client confidentiality is a broken legal
system. These cases, especially those of Alton Logan and Lee
Wayne Hunt garnered quite a bit of media attention. 157 CBS
News’ 60 Minutes aired specials on both cases. 158 The
heightened attention brought this issue to the forefront in
academic and journalistic circles. 159 Much of the discussion has
centered around the question of, “how our society can allow
lawyers to keep secrets about a man’s innocence for decades
because of some seemingly attenuated notion of confidentiality
owed to a client imprisoned for murder, even, in some cases,
after that client dies.” 160 One wonders “how we can praise
defense lawyers who wait half a lifetime until their client dies
before revealing that a long-imprisoned man is innocent, while
criticizing and even punishing them if they say anything while
the client is still alive.” 161 While we can praise those lawyers
for having such a commitment to the ethical rules, I propose
that there should be no such commitment required. In the face
of such a tremendous injustice, the rules must change.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Supra note 131.
Id.
Id.
Hasbani, supra note 120 at 277.
CBS News, supra note 17.
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
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ANALYSIS

The two most common arguments that supports breaching
confidentiality where the client holding the privilege still lives
are: 1) the line should be drawn at life and death, allowing
breach of confidentiality when a person is sentenced to death 162
and 2) the Model Rules exception to substantial bodily harm
should be read to include incarceration. 163 There are also
currently two states that have adopted rules of professional
conduct that specifically allow a lawyer to reveal confidential
information in cases
of wrongful incarceration. 164
Massachusetts and Alaska have each adopted similar
modifications to Model Rule 1.6. 165 Both states allow a lawyer
to reveal confidential information in order to prevent the
“wrongful execution or incarceration of another.” 166 This
section will proceed to analyze both solutions, as well as the
modified rules adopted by Massachusetts and Alaska, and
discuss whether any are sufficient to assist in cases such as
those illustrated above.
A. Drawing the Line at Life and Death
Drawing the line at life and death could potentially cover
two arguments: 1) that confidential information should be
revealed when an innocent person is facing the death penalty
and 2) that confidential information should be revealed when
the client holding the privilege is no longer alive. While both
of these arguments provide exceptions that may help in certain
situations, as will be explained, they would be unavailable to
help in most cases of wrongful incarceration. In the cases
where these exceptions would be available, the protection
afforded is not enough.
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may reveal confidential
information in order to prevent reasonably certain death. 167
According to the drafter’s comments to the Model Rules,
“[s]uch harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered
162. Id.
163. Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be A Wrongful
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 Nw.
U.L. Rev. Colloquy 391, 393 (2008).
164. Mass. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2013), Ak. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Supra note 123.
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imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that
a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails
to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.” 168 This vague
definition has left open to interpretation when a threat meets
the definition of “imminent” and “substantial” so as to allow
revelation. Some studies have provided that being convicted
and sentenced to death may not meet the requirement for
imminent harm. 169 The harm in being sentenced to death may
not be realized for many years, as the person convicted will
likely endure many appeals before actually facing death.
Professor Freedman, considered to be a legal ethics giant
and one of the strongest defenders of confidentiality, told the
New York Times that he would “draw the line at the life-anddeath situation” before revealing a confidence. 170 According to
Freedman, it would make the exception far too broad to
“extend it to incarceration in general.” 171 Freedman also noted,
however, that if the holder of the privilege were dead, and
“there is no threat of civil action against the client’s estate and
there are no survivors who continue to believe in the client’s
innocence,” then perhaps a broader exception would be
justified. 172
These exceptions both fall short in the cases of Alton
Logan, Lee Wayne Hunt and the many others like them.
Forcing an innocent person to endure decades in prison for a
crime he or she did not commit, only to be freed once the actual
perpetrator dies is not justice. There are three major problems
with this approach: 1) the statute allows a lawyer to reveal the
confidential information, it does not require it; 173 2) there is too
much room for interpretation allowing a different result in
different jurisdictions and; 3) under this exception, a person
may still remain in prison for years before gaining access to
evidence proving their innocence, and risks a chance that the
information will be lost before it can be revealed.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at Comment 6.
Miller, supra note 163 at 395–97.
Zitrin, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 123.
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B. Reading the Model Rules to Include Incarceration
within the Substantial Bodily Harm Exception
Reading the Model Rules to include incarceration within
the substantial bodily harm exception rests upon the
interpretation that incarceration itself is a substantial bodily
harm. Arguably, incarceration in any form may be construed
as harm, but is it “substantial bodily harm” as required under
the exception? Only when the wrongful incarceration of an
innocent man falls within the definition of “substantial bodily
harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) may a lawyer reveal the
confidential information to prevent or correct it. 174
In order to determine the meaning of “substantial bodily
harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), we must look to the
structure of the Model Rule. 175 The comments following each
Model Rule “explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose
of the Rule.” 176 “The Comments are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.” 177
The information that helps provide interpretation of
substantial bodily harm is contained in Comment 6, which
provides: 178
Paragraph (b)(1) recognized the overriding value of life and
physical integrity and permits disclosure necessary to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be
suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial
threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if
the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the
threat. 179

The comment provides that an interpretation of
substantial bodily harm must include two things; 1) the harm
must be “reasonably certain to occur”; and 2) it must be
suffered imminently OR have a present and substantial threat
that it will occur at a later date if a lawyer does not take
action. 180 In order to further assist in the interpretation of
substantial harm, Comment 6 also provides an example of a
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Gillers, supra note 132 at 14.
Id.
Gillers, supra note 132 at 31.
Gillers, supra note 132 at 31–32.
Supra note 123 at Comment 6.
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situation in which a lawyer can reveal confidential information
under this rule:
[A] lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally
discharged toxic waste into a town’s water supply may
reveal this information to the authorities if there is a
present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the
water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease
and the lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate
the
threat or reduce the number of victims. 181

Thus, we may construe from the hypothetical posed in
Comment 6, that the harm need not be the product of a
criminal act, nor must it be imminent if the harm is likely to
occur without the lawyer’s intervention.
Colin Miller, an associate professor of law at the
University of South Carolina School of Law, has provided an
interesting interpretation that may be construed to include
wrongful imprisonment as a substantial bodily harm. 182 Miller
bases his argument on the fact that three acts are statistically
more likely to occur to an individual in prison. 183 According to
various studies cited by Miller, an inmate faces an increased
risk of physical violence, a heightened rate of contracting
communicable diseases, and is subject to an increased risk of
same sex rape. 184 Comparing this increase risk factor to a
situation where a lawyer reasonably believes his client may
physically harm another person, Miller writes, “if we believe
that the risk of an intended assault and battery victim actually
suffering from substantial bodily harm is analogous to the
aggregate increased risk of a prisoner suffering from violence,
contracting a communicable disease, or being raped, disclosure
should be permitted or required in the wrongful incarceration
scenario.” 185 Thus, by being incarcerated, a prisoner is likely
to incur harm unless the lawyer intervenes.
Miller provides a well thought out argument for revelation
of confidential information under the current rules. 186 Most
states have adopted some form of Model Rule 1.6 or have a

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
See generally Miller, supra note 163.
Miller, supra note 163 at 397–98.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 402.
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similar rule. 187 In those states, Miller’s argument may provide
a possible solution. However, this method of interpretation still
provides insufficient protection for known innocent parties
wrongfully incarcerated. There are three major issues with
this approach: 1) revealing confidential information of a living
client violates their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
themselves; 2) there is too much room for interpretation
allowing a different result in different jurisdictions; and 3) this
interpretation still only allows a lawyer to reveal the
confidential information, it does not require it.
C. Modifying Rule 1.6 to Allow Revelation to Prevent
Wrongful Execution or Incarceration of Another
Modifying Model Rule 1.6 to specifically allow revelation
in the case of wrongful incarceration would eliminate the
guesswork for a lawyer faced with a scenario similar to the
example cases. Simply allowing revelation of confidential
information in order to prevent or rectify a wrongful
incarceration would provide a much broader scope of
exemptions to Model Rule 1.6. Adoption of such a rule would
require an institutional choice to place the rights of those
wrongfully incarcerated above the rights of the confessed
lawbreaker. Considering the inverse view can lead to grave
injustices against the innocent, as exemplified above, it should
not be a difficult leap to make. 188
Two states have adopted a specific exception to prevent the
wrongful execution or incarceration of another. 189
Massachusetts and Alaska have adopted similar text in their
versions of Model Rule 1.6 that specifically allow a lawyer to
reveal confidential information in order to prevent the
“wrongful execution or incarceration of another.” 190 Both
states still provide that the lawyer exercise discretion deciding
whether to disclose, it does not require disclosure. 191
Massachusetts Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that a lawyer may
reveal confidential information “to prevent the commission of
187. James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May A Lawyer
Reveal Her Client’s Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another?,
38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 811, appendix (2011).
188. See example cases supra Part II.
189. Supra note 164.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm,
or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration
of another.” 192 Massachusetts comment [6A] further provides
that Rule 1.6(b)(1) “also permits a lawyer to reveal confidential
information in the specific situation where such information
discloses that an innocent person has been convicted of a crime
and has been sentenced to imprisonment or execution.” 193
Thus, a lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential information
only after a known innocent person has been sentenced to
imprisonment. A conviction without a prison sentence still
requires a lawyer to maintain his clients secret. Currently,
there are no legal opinions or cases that apply this particular
exception in Massachusetts.
Alaska Rule 1.6(b)(1)(C) provides that, “A lawyer may
reveal a client’s confidence or secret to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain. . .
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.” 194 The Alaska
Comment notes that, “In paragraph (b)(1)(C), the court
included an additional limited exception to the normal rule
requiring lawyers to preserve the confidences and secrets of
their clients. This provision is modeled on the similar
Massachusetts rule: its core purpose is to permit a lawyer to
reveal confidential information in the specific situation in
which that information discloses that an innocent person has
been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to
Analogous to the
imprisonment or execution.” 195
Massachusetts exception, a lawyer in Alaska may, at their
discretion, reveal confidential information after an innocent
person has been incarcerated.
While the addition of specific rules is a step in the right
direction, they still fall short of protecting the rights of all the
parties involved. These rules certainly hold the possibility that
a lawyer could choose to assist an innocent person wrongfully
imprisoned but it does not require it. The addition of a
wrongful incarceration exception solves the dilemma of a
lawyer who is unsure whether or not they may reveal
192.
193.
194.
195.

Mass. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2013).
Id. at Comment [6A].
Ak. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).
Id. at Alaska Comment.
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confidential information, but it still leaves unsolved two of the
major issues: 1) revealing confidential information of a living
client violates their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
themselves, possibly subjecting them to prosecution; and 2)
this statute still only allows a lawyer to reveal the confidential
information, it does not require it.
The Problems Inherent to Establishing a New Exception
To resolve this moral and ethical duality, each issue must
be defused. In order to provide the protection from wrongful
incarceration a known innocent is entitled there must be a
balance. Aside from the issues presented in the solutions
proposed above, there are also concerns about the impact such
an exception would have on attorney-client confidentiality.196
In order to better extrapolate a practical solution, we must
take into consideration every issue.
A statute that would presume to assist the wrongfully
incarcerated must be written narrowly, allowing no room for
interpretation amongst jurisdictions.
It should make
revelation of confidential information mandatory. Allowing
revelation of confidential information to be optional in the case
of wrongful incarceration is not likely to produce a large influx
of defense attorney’s coming forward with their client’s
confidential information. 197 Defense lawyers’ loyalty to their
client’s is not based solely on the Model Rules. The average
defense lawyer will likely resist a rule forcing them to
implicate their client in another crime. 198 Their job is to
zealously defend their client, even in the face of known guilt. 199
If the revelation of a client’s secret is optional, no doubt most
criminal defense lawyers would balk at exercising that option.
The practice of law is a business, and who would choose to hire
a criminal defense attorney who has a reputation for breaching
confidentiality when it was not required?
A hypothetical posed by Professor Fred C. Zacharias in
Rethinking Confidentiality illustrates the problem of an
optional rule. 200 He presented the following scenario: “A client
196. Hasbani supra note 120 at 284.
197. See Hasbani supra note 120 at 299–303 (citing Leslie Levin, Testing the
Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm
Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 97 (1994)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 404
(1989).
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makes her attorney the following proposition: ‘If I double your
fee, would you waive your right to disclose?’ ” 201 Professor
Zacharias warns that drafters of a new code must decide
whether clients and attorneys should be allowed to change
confidentiality contractually. 202 However, even barring a
contractual limit, what will keep a lawyer from negotiating his
silence if his disclosure is merely optional?
Finally, there must be a consideration of the effect a new
exception to confidentiality would have on the attorney client
relationship. Many proponents for a new exception worry that
a new exception might chill communication between a client
and their attorney. 203 Those opposed to further exceptions
“contend that confidentiality exceptions will interfere with the
development of client trust and will discourage clients from
using or freely communicating with their counsel.” 204 An
optional rule would contribute even further to this problem.
Without clear guidelines lawyers would increasingly be
saddled with the dilemma of whether or not to reveal
confidential information, an inconsistency that may result in
distrust between a client and his attorney. A mandatory rule
provides assurance to a client by letting them know how their
attorney is going respond. This knowledge in itself speaks for
a lawyer’s integrity, rather than constantly questioning
whether a lawyer would decide to reveal information based on
their personal sense of right or wrong.
Many studies have been conducted about the potential
effects that confidentiality exceptions have on the candid and
frank disclosure by clients. 205 These studies have uncovered
that many attorneys do not discuss the subject of mandatory
disclosures “because they [felt] that discussions about
confidentiality exceptions would interfere with client trust.” 206
In those cases, when mandatory disclosure requires a lawyer
to reveal his client’s information, that client is more likely to
distrust an attorney and the legal profession in general.
Unfortunately, these studies have also concluded that a typical

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 97 (1994).
204. Id.
205. Freedman & Smith, supra note 126.
206. Levin, supra note 203 at 103–04, 122.
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client will not understand the complexities of the rule of
A
clients
confidentiality
and
its
exceptions. 207
misunderstanding of attorney-client confidentiality coupled
with the fact that attorneys choose not to explain possible
exceptions could lead to a general assumption that lawyers
‘hide the ball’ and are not up front and honest.
A significant contrast found in these studies is that
discussing disclosure exceptions with a client may actually
reduce “the likelihood that clients will say any more about the
subject.” 208 Warning clients about all the possible exceptions
available to an attorney before discussing a case would almost
certainly lead to inhibited discussion as the client would closely
consider everything he wants to reveal before revealing it. If
an attorney counsels a client about a wrongful incarceration
exception, the client may choose to withhold that information
and essentially making a new exception self-defeating. Given
the importance of preventing wrongful incarceration, a new
exception would at least afford an attorney in the position of
receiving such information the ability to prevent the injustice.
As a society, we have relied on the proposition that
allowing the guilty to go free on occasion is more acceptable
than allowing an innocent to remain in prison. It is with this
maxim in mind that the following solution is proposed, which
permits an exception with a consideration to all issues.
V.

A MANDATORY EXCEPTION FOR WRONGFUL
INCARCERATION SHOULD BE ADOPTED

The current exceptions to Model Rule 1.6 afford attorney’s
very broad discretion. The fact that, as of this writing, I was
unable to find a single reported case of an attorney coming
forward based on the Massachusetts or Alaska wrongful
incarceration statutes supports the theory that an optional
rule may not be effective. A mandatory rule would at least
guarantee that the person wrongfully incarcerated would have
a means of obtaining the truth.
In a wrongful incarceration scenario, where an attorney
reveals confidential information of his client, we still have the
problem of the clients Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth
207. Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client confidentiality Necessary?, 15 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 477, 505 (2002).
208. Levin, supra note 203 at 125.
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Amendment prevents “the use, in a criminal prosecution, of a
defendant’s testimony elicited by compulsion.” 209 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States held that
an attorney cannot be compelled to break the attorney-client
privilege, as it would be a violation of the clients Fifth
Amendment right. 210 Fisher ascertained that any information
that would be protected under the Fifth Amendment for the
individual must also be protected by their lawyer. 211 In a
wrongful incarceration situation however, it is not the
compulsion to elicit information that triggers a Fifth
Amendment violation, it is triggered if used against that
person. In order to resolve this problem of violating the
confessed criminal’s Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
themselves, use of immunity for the confessing client must be
part of the solution.
Use of immunity prevents the prosecution from using the
confidential information elicited by compulsion against the
criminal defendant. 212 In the case of a wrongful incarceration
situation, the elicited confidential information would be used
to free the innocent, but it would be unavailable in a criminal
prosecution against the client. Without use of immunity, any
attorney who reveals confidential information that is used
against a client in a criminal prosecution is a violation of the
client’s constitutional rights.
Use of immunity in these cases would not necessarily
constitute a get out of jail free card for self-confessed criminals.
An attorney under these circumstances would only reveal
confidential information to the extent necessary to ascertain
the innocence of a person wrongfully incarcerated. While any
information revealed by the attorney would be protected from
use, it would not prevent the prosecution from continuing to
investigate the unsolved crime and prosecuting the client
based on independent evidence.
Use of immunity would protect a guilty client’s
constitutional rights at the expense of the evidence presented

209. Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of client Confidences
to Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1120 (1985).
210. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
211. Freedman & Smith, supra note 126.
212. Celeste Bacchi, Immunity in Exchange for Testimony, (last visited Dec
15, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/immunity-exchangetestimony.html.

BELSEY FINAL

174

12/21/2015 6:19 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

to prove the innocence of a person wrongfully incarcerated. Its
use may be looked upon with disdain by victims and their
families, knowing that the actual criminal cannot be held
responsible for the crime in some situations. Even more
difficult to accept is the knowledge that the self-confessed
criminals who benefit from this rule may be free from
prosecution and have the ability to continue committing
similar crimes. The Supreme Court has said that the “social
good derived from the proper performance of the function of
lawyers acting for their clients . . . outweighs the harm that
may come from the suppression of evidence.” 213 This reasoning
should also apply to the social good of righting the injustice of
wrongful incarceration.
A mandatory wrongful incarceration exception to the
attorney-client privilege provides a solution to all the issues
presented. 214 While there are certainly serious drawbacks to
this type of an exception, those drawbacks will likely still exist
without an exception and an innocent person will be
incarcerated for a crime he did not commit. The guilty party
whose confessed crime remains confidential will still be free to
commit similar crimes. While the victims and their family may
feel better believing the responsible party is being held
responsible, their comfort in a false belief does not justify the
unjust suffering of an innocent person.
The following proposed modification to Model Rule 1.6 215
should be adopted:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted or
required by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal, and must reveal in subsection
(8), information relating to the representation of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(Exceptions 1 through 7 excluded)
(8) to rectify the wrongful execution or
incarceration of another; a person whose information is

213. Possley, supra note 12.
214. See supra Part IV.
215. Gillers supra note 132 at 30.
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revealed in this manner is granted use immunity for the
information provided.
This proposed modification should include a comment
similar to Massachusetts’s comment [6A] permitting “a lawyer
to reveal confidential information in the specific situation
where such information discloses that an innocent person has
been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to
imprisonment or execution.” 216 The requirement that the
innocent person has already been convicted and sentenced is
absolutely necessary.
Without a wrongful conviction
requirement, there would be many self-confessed criminals
attempting to take advantage of use immunity when revelation
may not be necessary. The innocent person may still be found
innocent by a court of law. The revelation of confidential
information and subsequent granting of use immunity should
only be used after an innocent person has been convicted and
sentenced and the guilty party has essentially gotten away
with their crime.
Granting use immunity also provides a solution to the
client-trust issue. A client is more apt to trust a lawyer who
discloses that he may be required to reveal confidential
information, even against his will, and that any information
disclosed will not be used to harm the client. In these cases, the
attorney may even be seen as having more integrity obeying
the rules while preventing harm to his client. With use of
immunity required under the Fifth Amendment, the likelihood
that this new exception would chill communication between
clients and their attorneys would be minimal and any damage
to the client lawyer trust relationship would be far outweighed
by the injustice done to an innocent person wrongfully
incarcerated.
CONCLUSION
Wrongful incarceration is a grievously unfortunate flaw in
the legal system. In most cases, when an innocent person is
wrongfully convicted, the truth is only ever known by the guilty
parties and the unfortunate person wrongfully convicted. In
those rare cases where a lawyer, who is an officer of the court,
knows the truth, failure to right this wrong is an unacceptable
breakdown within the justice system.
216. Supra note 192 at Comment [6A].
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A wrongful incarceration exception is not a perfect
solution. The solution posed by this paper allows the
possibility that a client who confesses to murder may never be
prosecuted for the murder. Contrast that scenario with one in
which the murderer is never prosecuted because an innocent
person was found guilty for their crime and serving life in
prison or facing capital punishment. The choice is an obvious
one. A system founded upon the ideal “That it is better 100
guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person
should suffer” should readily embrace a wrongful incarceration
exception. The solution proposed in this paper that chooses to
right the wrong to the innocent rather than preserving the
right to prosecute the guilty is consistent with that maxim.

